Intertemporal Choice by Stevens, Jeffrey R.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of 
2010 
Intertemporal Choice 
Jeffrey R. Stevens 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jstevens5@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub 
 Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Stevens, Jeffrey R., "Intertemporal Choice" (2010). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 520. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/520 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, 
Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Introduction 
A Clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) flies to the 
top of a pine tree and selects one of the many cones. She 
twists and pecks at the stem until the cone breaks free 
from the branch and, with one foot, holds the cone in 
the crotch of a branch. She then repeatedly hammers her 
long bill in between the scales of the cone. After forcing 
out one of the seeds, she tips her head back a bit, clicks 
the seed in her bill a few times, and closes her bill. A few 
minutes later, the shredded cone drops to the snow, the 
nutcracker having extracted several dozen seeds. Each 
time she closes her bill, the nutcracker makes a choice: 
she either swallows the seed or places it in a small 
pouch of skin under her tongue. The seeds placed in her 
pouch are destined for a site several kilometers away, 
where she buries them under a bit of dirt or leaf litter. In 
the autumn, she may bury 33,000 seeds in this manner, 
only to return to uncover them a few months later dur-
ing the harsh mountain winter. This form of food stor-
ing or caching typifies an interesting and wide-ranging 
set of decisions faced by animals: intertemporal choices. 
The term “intertemporal” choice refers to decisions 
in which the benefits associated with different outcomes 
occur at different times. For instance, for each seed, the 
nutcracker must choose between eating it now versus 
waiting to consume it in the winter. Often, there exists 
a trade-off between the size of the benefit and the cost 
(time delay), such that larger benefits accrue after longer 
delays. Thus, the decisions of interest are between ob-
taining immediate or short-term rewards and investing 
in a grander future. 
Intertemporal Choice in the Wild 
Although not usually framed in this way, many deci-
sions that animals face involve a temporal trade-off. The 
life history trade-off of growth versus reproduction of-
fers an example of balancing the immediate, competi-
tive benefits of growing larger with the delayed benefits 
of investing in offspring. Even plants and other organ-
isms face these kinds of temporal trade-offs. Although 
these provide perfectly reasonable examples of tempo-
ral trade-offs, most work in this area has explored more 
active intertemporal choice decisions that often reflect 
the particular ecology of the individual species. The 
food caching example provides a nice illustration of spe-
cies-specific choices between immediate and delayed 
consumption in a foraging context. Caching provides a 
remarkable example of intertemporal choice because of 
the long delay until food recovery. Many other forag-
ing-based intertemporal choices involve rather short de-
lays: for instance, continuing feeding in the current food 
patch versus moving on to another patch. In fact, patch 
exploitation offers a classic example of intertemporal 
choice from behavioral ecology that is well studied both 
theoretically and empirically. 
Imagine a bird eating berries from a bush. Every 
berry consumed depletes the patch and increases the av-
erage time required to find the next berry. When should 
the bird stop searching in that patch (after all, there 
may be no more berries in the bush) and move to the 
next bush? Staying too long can waste time better used 
in searching for food elsewhere. Leaving too early can 
waste opportunities to obtain a quick meal. Optimal for-
aging theory predicts a simple patch-leaving rule when 
patches are similar: leave when the foraging rate in the 
patch drops below the average foraging rate in the envi-
ronment. We can calculate this foraging rate: 
                                                  A 
                                             τ + t + h            [1] 
where A represents the amount of food, τ represents the 
time required to travel between patches, t represents the 
delay to finding food within a patch, and h represents 
the time required to process and consume the food. 
Maximizing this foraging rate results in an optimal solu-
tion to the question of intertemporal choice in the patch-
foraging situation. 
Foraging decisions often involve the temporal trad-
eoffs characterizing intertemporal choices, from patch 
foraging to caching to decide between a smaller, easier-
to- process food item and a larger, more difficult one. 
Yet intertemporal choice extends far beyond foraging. 
Returning to the category of life history examples, pa-
rental investment exemplifies an important temporal 
tradeoff. Investment in current offspring reduces poten-
tial investment in future offspring. How should a parent 
distribute investment over time? Also, mating decisions 
have a critical temporal component—along the lines of 
choosing between Mr. Right and Mr. Right Now. Should 
an individual accept the currently available mate or con-
tinue looking for a higher quality mate? 
Cooperative situations may also involve intertempo-
ral choices. Reciprocal altruism, for instance, requires 
that animals trade the immediate benefits of defection 
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against the delayed benefits of reciprocated cooperation. 
Clearly, many behaviors fall under the umbrella of in-
tertemporal choices, although they are not typically an-
alyzed with this framework. Even when viewing these 
decisions as intertemporal choices, researchers use var-
ious terms such as temporal discounting, self-control, 
impulsivity, patience, and delayed gratification. Because 
of the broad nature of intertemporal choices, they have 
attracted the attention of many disciplines, including 
economics and psychology, as well as biology. 
Economics of Intertemporal Choice 
One of the first disciplines to investigate intertemporal 
choice was economics. Economists study the consump-
tion of goods and services; thus, they want to know how 
agents manage streams of benefits that accrue over time. 
How do they balance the consumption of a small amount 
of a commodity now compared to a larger amount later? 
The economic perspective focuses on a “rational” account 
of how agents should respond to choices over time. That 
is, assuming that agents have all information about the 
goods, what response provides the optimal return? Econ-
omists noticed that, when given a choice between the 
same benefit immediately or in the future (say, one dol-
lar now vs. in 20 years), people preferred the immediate 
payoff. This effect suggests that people temporally dis-
count or devalue future payoffs. In other words, a delay 
reduces the subjective value of receiving a benefit. Why 
should we discount the future? 
Economic theory proposes a number of reasons 
to discount the future. First, inflation literally makes 
money less valuable. One dollar will buy more lolli-
pops today than it will after 20 years. Also, individuals 
can invest currently available benefits. That is, there are 
opportunity costs associated with not being able to use 
or invest benefits that are locked away during the de-
lay. Investing one dollar now will yield much more in 
20 years than one dollar. Finally, the future is uncertain. 
A bird in the hand is worth three in the bush because 
the three in the bush may never be in hand. Future re-
wards run the risk of not being realized; instead, some 
force may interrupt their consumption. 
These three reasons for discounting are related, and 
economists have developed a model to account for in-
tertemporal choice. In this model, each option yields a 
present value: 
V = δtA                                          [2] 
where δ represents a discount factor and t represents the 
delay to receiving reward amount A. The discount fac-
tor δ accounts for the remaining value after a single unit 
of delay (thus, from δ we can calculate the rate of dis-
counting—the proportional rate of decrease in value). 
This “exponential discounting model” has a special fea-
ture: the rate of discounting remains constant across the 
delay (Figure 1). So, a reward delayed 1 day after an-
other reward is available will lose the same value if 
the first reward is available today or in a year. In other 
words, value decreases at the same rate across time. 
Figure 1. Models of temporal discounting describe how the subjective value of a reward at the present time decreases with the delay to re-
ceiving that reward. The exponential model promoted by economists predicts that the rate of discounting is constant over time, whereas, 
the hyperbolic model promoted by psychologists predicts a decreasing rate of discounting. As an example, we can compare the difference in 
values for the two models over two time frames: from t = 0 to t = 10 and from t = 10 to t = 20. At t = 0, both the hyperbolic model (Vh(0)) 
and the exponential model (Ve(0)) start with a value of 1. At t = 10, Vh(10) = 0.65 and Ve(10) = 0.61, thus the hyperbolic value decreased by 
0.35 in 10 time units, and the exponential value decreased by 0.39. At t = 20, however, Vh(20) = 0.48 and Ve(20) = 0.37. The relative decrease 
from t = 10 is 0.26 for hyperbolic and again 0.39 for exponential. Thus, the decrease remained the same for exponential value but diminished 
for hyperbolic value.  
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This constant rate of discounting makes sense when 
organisms discount because of future uncertainty, that 
is, when the risk of interruption makes a delayed re-
ward less valuable. If random events interrupt the re-
ceipt of delayed payoffs, then decision makers face 
a constant probability of loss, making discounting to 
match the environmental loss rate beneficial. Thus, dis-
counting may closely relate to uncertainty and risk. 
Psychology of Intertemporal Choice 
For decades, psychologists have acted as the fly in the 
ointment for the elegant economic models of decision 
making. The psychological approach focuses on describ-
ing the actual behavior of decision makers rather than 
creating models of omniscient, godlike agents. In many 
cases, the models do not hold up well—behavior devi-
ates substantially from the rational predictions. So, how 
can we measure the temporal preferences of animals to 
test the models? 
Experimental Methods 
Animal experiments often use the “self-control” par-
adigm to explore intertemporal choice (Figure 2(a)). 
This typically involves offering a subject the choice 
between a smaller amount of food after a shorter de-
lay (smaller–sooner option) and a larger amount of 
food available after a longer delay (larger–later op-
tion). Subjects often start with a fixed set of options, 
then the experimenter adjusts either the long delay or 
the larger amount to titrate an indifference point, that 
is, to find a pair of options between which the sub-
jects choose equally. For example, a subject may first 
face the choice between two food items available im-
mediately and six food items available immediately. 
Assuming that the subject prefers the larger amount, a 
one-second delay is added to the larger option. The ex-
perimenter will continue to add one second increments 
to the large amount until the subject chooses the two 
immediate food items as often as she chooses the six 
delayed items. This indifference point then indicates 
how long a subject will wait for three times as much 
food. Many psychologists interpret these data as a kind 
of discounting: the delayed food loses value relative to 
the immediate food. As discussed later, biologists have 
another interpretation that does not invoke discount-
ing. Pigeons have been the workhorse for self-control 
experiments, but rats and primates have been tested 
using this technique as well. 
The “delayed gratification” technique provides a 
second method to study intertemporal choice in an-
imals (Figure 2(b)). This method mirrors Walter 
Mischel’s pioneering work on delayed gratification in 
children. In the animal version, a stream of food re-
wards accumulates over a period of time. For instance, 
a grape appears in front of the subject every 5 s. The 
catch is, once a subject interrupts this stream by reach-
ing for or eating the food, the stream stops. So if sub-
jects can delay their gratification, they will receive all 
of the rewards in the stream; however, they constantly 
face the temptation to consume the available rewards. 
Rather than choosing between two options, in the de-
layed gratification paradigm, subjects choose when to 
stop waiting for the reward. Researchers have primar-
ily used this method with primates but occasionally 
with pigeons as well. 
Hyperbolic Discounting 
Most work on animal intertemporal choice uses the self-
control paradigm and assumes that this tests temporal 
discounting in their subjects. With a series of indiffer-
ence points, one can derive a discounting function that 
quantitatively describes how reward values decrease 
with delays. Recall that exponential discounting (Equa-
tion [2]) implies a constant rate of discounting. Unfortu-
nately, experiments in both humans and other animals 
show little support for this prediction. Instead, the dis-
count rate decreases with time, showing high discount-
ing at short delays and a lower rate at longer delays 
(Figure 1). This type of discounting is termed “hyper-
bolic discounting.” Psychologists favor a particular hy-
perbolic function that describes how the present value 
of a reward amount A decreases with the delay t : 
                                   V  =       A                                               1 + kt             [3] 
Figure 2. (a) The most frequently used method to investigate in-
tertemporal choice in pigeons and rats is the self-control paradigm. 
In this technique, subjects experience an intertrial interval in which 
nothing happens. Following this interval, subjects choose between 
receiving a small amount of food after a short delay and a large 
amount of food after a long delay. After consuming the food, another 
intertrial interval begins. (b) In the delayed gratification paradigm, a 
certain amount of food accumulates at fixed rate, say, one food re-
ward per 10 s. Interrupting the stream of food results in stopping 
the accumulation of rewards.  
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where k represents a discounting parameter that ac-
counts for the steepness of the slope. This model has a 
declining discounting rate and describes data from pi-
geons, rats, and humans quite well. 
The actual rate of discounting also violates the eco-
nomic model. If viewed as a proxy for the interest rate 
in humans or the interruption rate in animals, the rate 
of discounting should be rather small. A rational inves-
tor should have a discount rate that matches available 
interest rates (around, say, 5% per year). In experiments 
and “field studies” in humans, the estimated discount-
ing rates often range between 10 and 30% per year for 
delays beyond 1 year (and are much higher for shorter 
delays). Humans, therefore, choose much more impul-
sively than predicted by economic analysis because 
they have strong preferences for sooner outcomes. An-
imals also exhibit impulsive preferences, but on an even 
shorter time scale, typically only waiting for seconds or 
minutes for delayed payoffs. This would imply implau-
sibly high interruption rates (up to four interruptions 
per minute!) to discount the future at this level. Thus, 
from a psychological perspective, high levels of impul-
sivity remain a puzzle. Rather than offer ultimate expla-
nations of behavior, the psychological perspective em-
phasizes the cognitive variables underlying behavior. 
Cognitive Variables 
The psychological study of intertemporal choice often 
highlights how individuals overcome temptation for 
short-term gratification. A number of cognitive vari-
ables play key roles in trade-offs between short- and 
long-term rewards. 
Commitment 
One way to avoid the temptation of immediate gratifi-
cation is to use external commitment devices that force 
an individual to choose the delayed option. Examples 
of commitment devices in humans include automat-
ically transferring salary into a retirement account to 
save money for the future, throwing away a pack of cig-
arettes to avoid smoking, placing the alarm clock across 
the room to avert the draw of the snooze button, and 
Ulysses lashing himself to the mast of his ship to resist 
the Sirens’ songs. Although little or no evidence sug-
gests that animals actively pursue commitment devices, 
they can use them when available. For instance, Howard 
Rachlin and Leonard Green conducted a series of exper-
iments in which pigeons faced an additional choice be-
fore experiencing the standard self-control choice be-
tween a smaller–sooner and larger–later option. In one 
version of the task, the subjects could choose between 
experiencing a delay, then continuing on to the stan-
dard self-control choice or experiencing a delay, then 
automatically receiving the larger–later option. This sec-
ond choice represents a form of commitment because 
the pigeons can commit themselves in advance to the 
larger–later option. Interestingly, the pigeons did use 
the commitment device, and most subjects significantly 
preferred it when a long delay separated to two sets of 
choices. Therefore, the pigeons used commitment if the 
temptation was far enough in the future. 
Reward magnitude 
Both the exponential and hyperbolic models predict that 
the absolute magnitude of the rewards should not mat-
ter; only the relative magnitudes should matter. So, the 
choice between one food item now and three items to-
morrow should be devalued the same way as 20 items 
now and 60 items tomorrow. Only the threefold increase 
in reward amount should matter. The absolute magni-
tude does, however, influence choices in humans: the 
discounting rate decreases as the magnitude increases. 
So, human subjects choose more patiently (meaning that 
they opt for the larger–later reward more often) when 
assessing rewards in hundreds or thousands of dollars 
compared to tens of dollars. Interestingly, this “magni-
tude effect” does not appear in animals. The ratio of re-
wards influences choices rather than the absolute mag-
nitude. Testing the magnitude effect, however, proves 
difficult in animals because the magnitudes cannot scale 
to the same degree as in humans. Experiments in hu-
mans can vary hypothetical monetary payoffs over sev-
eral orders of magnitude, whereas animal food rewards 
can only vary over a single order of magnitude. Thus, 
as we will see in the next section, the currency of the re-
ward is a key aspect of intertemporal choice. 
Currency 
Food is the most commonly used reward currency in 
studies of animal intertemporal choice because it is easy 
to manipulate, highly motivating, and slow to cause sa-
tiation. Most experimental studies show that animals 
will wait for seconds or minutes for food rewards. Wa-
ter provides another primary reward (a reward needed 
for survival) used in studies of intertemporal choice. 
Self-control studies rewarding deprived rats with wa-
ter show similar patterns as when using food: rats only 
wait for a few seconds and their discounting function 
matches the hyperbolic model. Unfortunately, we do 
not have good experimental data on other currencies 
such as mating opportunities or social contact, but this 
provides an important avenue of future research. If in-
tertemporal choices are adaptive in animals, we might 
expect that different currencies vary in how they lose 
value over different time scales, and animal intertempo-
ral choices might match this variation. Food may elicit a 
strong preference for immediacy because it often does 
not persist long in the environment—competitors will 
take it if you do not. Also, food is, of course, something 
animals constantly need, so discounting of food may re-
sult from close ties to metabolic rates. 
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Currency effects appear more prominently in hu-
mans. Food, money, and health options all seem to 
show hyperbolic discounting but over different time 
scales. In fact, when tested with food in a similar way 
as other animals, humans also show very impulsive 
choices. So, food seems to be a universally impulsive 
currency. However, money and health options allow for 
much longer-term delays, even if they are shorter than 
those predicted by economic models. 
Attention 
Mischel’s work on delayed gratification in children 
highlights the role of attention. In his design, an ex-
perimenter placed a single treat (cookie or marshmal-
low) in front of a child and said that she would leave 
the room. If the child waited and did not eat the treat 
until she returned, the child could have two additional 
treats. The experimenter would then leave the room and 
measure how long the children would wait (up to 15–
20 min). Mischel and colleagues manipulated attention 
in several ways. First, they simply varied whether the 
children could see the treat. When the treat was hidden, 
the children waited significantly longer than when it 
was visible. Next, the experimenters drew the children’s 
attention to the treat in different ways. They either fo-
cused the children’s attention on the delicious proper-
ties of the treat (e.g., “the marshmallow sure looks like 
a yummy, sweet treat, doesn’t it?”) or had them divert 
their attention by thinking of the treat as something else 
(e.g., “imagine the marshmallow is a soft, fluffy cloud”). 
Again, diverting attention from the treat as food in-
creased patience. Similar studies in animals have used 
the delayed gratification paradigm. Pigeons, for in-
stance, can wait longer when their food is not visible, 
and chimpanzees can wait longer when experiment-
ers provide toys to distract subjects from the accumu-
lating food. The availability of distraction therefore can 
increase patience—reducing attention to waiting makes 
delays more tolerable. 
Mechanisms of control 
One of the most interesting and controversial topics in 
psychology is the nature of mechanisms of control over 
behavior. Are behaviors consciously or reflexively con-
trolled? Are they genetically determined, learned, or 
reasoned out? These questions certainly apply to inter-
temporal choice, but unfortunately we have not begun 
to address them systematically. Claiming that plants 
make intertemporal choices suggests that strong genetic 
mechanisms with relevant environmental input can 
generate intertemporal choices. Of course, the same can 
be said of animals. Parasitoid wasps, for instance, can 
detect cues associated with a short life expectancy (such 
as lower barometric pressure indicating an impending 
storm).When detecting these cues, they lay more eggs in 
lower quality hosts than in the absence of the cues. They 
therefore accept a lower reproductive output when re-
sponding to a shortened temporal horizon. Caching also 
likely falls under the category of intertemporal choices 
with strong genetic components. Caching species prob-
ably do not weigh the current and future benefits of the 
seeds in front of them—foresight months into the future 
seems unlikely. Nevertheless, caching species show ex-
treme flexibility in their behavior, and foresight into a 
much shorter future seems perfectly reasonable. Exper-
iments with scrub jays show that they attend to the de-
cay of food, the time since caching, the presence of pos-
sible cache thieves, and future need. Thus, they have an 
extraordinarily flexible system for dealing with delayed 
rewards, although we do not fully understand how they 
represent the future. The abstract representation of time 
in humans allows us extreme flexibility in anticipat-
ing future payoffs—we can mentally travel in time. Al-
though other animals can plan for the short term (hours, 
maybe days), the full scope of their mental time hori-
zons remains unclear. 
Evolution of Intertemporal Choice 
The psychological approach offers insight into the 
mechanisms of intertemporal choice, but it does not of-
fer a satisfying explanation of the circumstances under 
which animals should choose patiently or impulsively. 
An evolutionary account, however, can make specific 
predictions about temporal preferences and the change 
in discount rate over time. The evolutionary view 
stresses the fit between the decision mechanisms used to 
make temporal trade-offs and the environment in which 
these mechanisms evolved. Thus, natural selection fa-
vors a good fit between the decisions and the ecology 
of organisms—temporal preferences should be “ecolog-
ically rational” rather than economically rational. This 
perspective leads to predictions that can account for 
some of the variation in species differences in patience 
and impulsivity. 
The ecological rationality perspective suggests that de-
cision mechanisms should fit the environment in which 
they operate. Thus, intertemporal choices should match 
the kinds of problems often faced by animals. This may 
explain animal impulsivity in the self-control paradigm. 
Rather than discounting, the rats and pigeons in these ex-
periments may use simple rate-maximizing rules that are 
adapted to foraging in patches (maximizing intake also 
results in a hyperbolic discounting function). David Ste-
phens and his colleagues have proposed that actual for-
aging situations rarely have the property of simultaneous 
choice used in the self-control paradigms (Figure 2(a)). 
Instead, animals typically choose when to leave a patch. 
A rule that maximizes the short-term intake rate: 
                                              A 
                                            t + h        [4] 
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where t represents the delay and h represents the time 
required to process the food, makes similar predictions 
as the long-term rule (Equation [1]) in the patch situa-
tion. In the self-control situation, however, it predicts 
impulsive choice. Experiments with blue jays suggest 
that they make appropriate decisions in a patch situa-
tion, but choose more impulsively than expected in a 
self-control situation. This short-term rule is ecologically 
rational because it works well in a more naturalistic en-
vironment in which animals forage in patches. 
Ecological rationality can also make predictions about 
species differences in intertemporal choice because spe-
cies differ in their ecologies. Although relatively few an-
imals have been tested systematically, interesting pat-
terns emerge in the data across species. Comparing 
species can pose difficulties, especially with phyloge-
netically distant species. With more closely related spe-
cies, however, the comparative method can yield inter-
esting insights. For instance, chimpanzees and bonobos 
are sister taxa that share many morphological, ecolog-
ical, and behavioral similarities. Yet, they differ in key 
aspects of their foraging ecologies. Although their di-
ets overlap substantially, chimpanzees often hunt for 
food, whereas bonobos spend more time consuming the 
abundant terrestrial herbaceous vegetation in their habi-
tat. This means that chimpanzees frequently face delays 
in food consumption: they decide to hunt and then must 
wait until capturing food before consuming it. Bonobos, 
in contrast, rarely hunt, instead feeding on the plentiful 
vegetation that is virtually immediately accessible. Eco-
logical rationality would predict that these differences 
in foraging ecology should translate into different deci-
sion mechanisms and preferences between the two spe-
cies. In fact, chimpanzees are more patient in the self-
control task than bonobos, reflecting the differences in 
natural foraging. Although chimpanzees and bonobos 
differ, they wait longer than any other species system-
atically tested so far. Macaques wait for an intermedi-
ate length of time, and capuchin monkeys, tamarins, 
and marmosets wait as long as pigeons and rats. Yet dif-
ferences still exist between these species, some of which 
may result from foraging ecology. The comparative 
study of intertemporal choice remains in its infancy, and 
testing more species can help reveal the underlying na-
ture of temporal preferences. 
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